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THE DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS

IN TEN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS*

JOHN HAGAN ILENE H. NAGEL (BERNSTEIN)

University of Wisconsin-Madison Indiana University

University of Toronto

CELESTA ALBONETTI

Indiana University

American Sociological Review 1980, Vol. 45 (October):802-820

While sociologists have long debated the relationship between the status characteristics of

criminal offenders and the sentences they receive, they have done so with data sets drawn from

state courts whose prosecutorial resources are focused almost entirely on low status

defendants. Qualitative and quantitative data analyzed in this paper are drawn from ten federal

district courts whose statutes and resources provide greater potential for the prosecution of the

white-collar crimes of higher status offenders. Three questions are addressed: (1) Are there

substantial jurisdictional differences in the prosecution of white-collar cases? if so, (2) Are there

corresponding jurisdictional differences in the sentencing of white-collar cases? and (3) Within

jurisdictions, are there further differences in the factors that influence sentencing decisions in

white-collar as compared to other kinds of cases? The data are analyzed from a perspective that

emphasizes organizational considerations: we conceptualize the criminal justice process as a

loosely coupled system and the use of prosecutorial resources as proactive and reactive. We

argue that the expanded prosecution of white-collar persons for their white-collar crimes

requires a proactive prosecutorial policy and a tightening of the coupling between plea

negotiations and sentencing decisions in the prosecutorial and judicial subsystems. Our

quantitative analysis reveals that one district follows a uniquely proactive pattern. As expected,

this proactive district also exhibits a unique leniency in the sentencing of college educated

white-collar criminals that is related to earlier plea and charging decisions. A rather different

and unanticipated pattern of leniency is found in this district for less educated white-collar

offenders. A conclusion of this study is that there may be an inverse relationship between the

volume of white-collar prosecutions and the severity with which they are sentenced.

tier, 1979:40-6). What is surprising is the

The existence of systematic links be-

inconclusiveness of the findings that flow

tween the status characteristics of crimi-

from this work.

nal offenders and the sentences they re-

The problem is not simply that these

ceive has been debated for some time (see

findings are inconsistent, although they

Hagan, 1974). This debate is grounded in

are that. For all the studies that find little

issues of theory and policy. For example,

Chiricos and Waldo (1975) regard a re-

(e.g., Bernstein et al., 1977) or no (e.g.,

lationship between class position and

Chiricos and Waldo, 1975) relationship

between status characteristics and sen-

sentencing as crucial to one prominent

version (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971) of

tencing, there are still those that find this

a conflict theory of crime, while the ab-

relationship to be substantial (e.g.,

sence of such a relationship is usually

Swigert and Farrell, 1977; Lizotte, 1978).

deemed essential to notions of "equality

However, the larger issue is that the data

sets on which these studies are based are

before the law." It therefore is not sur-

prising that this type of debate has gener-

widely thought to be inadequate. Specifi-

ated a large volume of research (see Net-

cally, critics (e.g., Greenberg, 1977; Hop-

kins, 1977; Reasons, 1977) note that the

samples considered in these studies con* Direct all correspondence to: John Hagan; De-

sist almost entirely of low status defendpartment of Sociology; Erindale College; University

of Toronto; Mississauga, Ontario L5L-1C6.

ants, making this research mainly a matter

Research reported in this paper was funded by the
of within- rather than between-class

Crime and Delinquency section of the National In-

comparisons. Thus, while (to date) re-

stitute of Mental Health. The authors wish to thank

search of this type has focused on the
the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their

sentencing of "traditional" or "common"

helpful comments.
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THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF

crimes (e.g., murder, robbery, larceny,

WHITE-COLLAR JUSTICE

etc.), Hopkins (1977:177) points out that

"The illegal activities of the middle and

To understand the sanctioning of

upper classes are typically such things as

white-collar persons and their white-collar

income tax evasion and, in the case of

crimes we must consider the system in

businessmen, price fixing, violation of

which this occurs. In this section, we de-

pollution laws and misrepresentation in

velop a perspective for viewing the opera-

advertising."

tions of this system. The perspective we

Three problems account for the failure

offer is derived from the work of others

of recent research to consider the latter

and from the interviews and observations

kinds of crimes, which usually are desig-

gathered in site visits to the ten district

nated vaguely as "white-collar crimes."

courts. The districts and their principal

First, there is an uncertainty about what,

cities are Eastern and Southern New York

and who, to study. The difficulty is that

(Brooklyn and Manhattan), Northern Il-

not all white-collar crimes (e.g., income

linois (Chicago), Eastern Pennsylvania

tax violations) are committed by white-

(Philadelphia), Maryland (Baltimore),

collar persons, and not all white-collar

Northern Texas (Dallas), Western

persons commit white-collar crimes (e.g.,

Missouri (Kansas City), Northern Georgia

the crimes of Patty Hearst). We respond

(Atlanta), Central California (Los

to this problem in this paper by cross-

Angeles), and Eastern Michigan (Detroit).

classifying indicators of the status of the

During the site visits we observed ap-

offender and the offense. This allows us to

proximately 200 hours of court proceed-

compare the prosecution and sentencing

ings and conducted approximately 600

of the white-collar crimes of white-collar

hours of interviews with the following

persons with the prosecution and sen-

court personnel: 9 Chief Judges and 42

tencing of other offender-offense combi-

Presiding Judges, 8 United States Attor-

nations (see later pages, herein, for further

neys and 48 Assistant United States At-

elaboration of this point). Second, the

torneys, 14 Probation Officers, 15 Admin-

former kinds of white-collar crimes are

istrators of Pre-Trial Services Agencies,

prosecuted with their greatest frequency

31 Magistrates, and 10 Chiefs of Public

in the American federal courts. To date,

Defender Offices.'

most sociological research on sentencing

Reiss (1971; 1974) conceptualizes the

has been done in the state courts. Third,

criminal justice system as a loosely ar-

much of the white-collar crime of white-

ticulated operating network of input-

collar persons is 'beyond incrimination"

output relationships among a series of

(Kennedy, 1970). That is, much of this

subsystems; a set of relationships that we

white-collar "indiscretion" is handled in

the civil courts, or not dealt with at all.

However, this situation shows signs of

1 These interviews were conducted over a ten-

change.
week period, with one week spent in each of the ten

Some U.S. Attorney offices recently

districts. The ten jurisdictions comprise a purposive

sample selected by the Supreme Court (under
have begun to take increased initiative in

provisions of the Speedy Trial Act; see fn. 4) and

the prosecution of white-collar persons

intended to maximize the representation of major

and their white-collar crimes. The quanmetropolitan and geographic areas across the United

titative data analyzed in this paper consist

of cases prosecuted and sentenced over a

States. The first two authors of this paper conducted

the interviews together, using a set of structured,

open-ended interview schedules that are available on
several-year period in ten federal district

request. Our purpose was to interview a cross-

courts, including one of the first U.S. At-

section of court personnel across the ten districts.

torney offices in this country reputed to
Unedited excerpts from these interviews are quoted

have made the prosecution of white-collar

in this article. One Chief Judge refused to be inter-

viewed and two U.S. Attorneys were not available
cases a high priority; qualitative data, as

for interviews. However, the First Assistant to each

well, were gathered through observations

of the latter U.S. Attorneys was interviewed and our

and interviews in these courts. The latter
coverage otherwise was quite comprehensive. These

data are used first to ground the following

discussion of "white-collar justice."

qualitative data were generated to correspond to the

quantitative data discussed later in this paper.
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will refer to as a "loosely coupled sysplaints. That is, prosecutors can simply

tem" (Hagan et al., 1979; see also Meyer

respond to what the police bring to their

and Rowan, 1977). Discretion is dispersed
attention. Indeed, the influx of cases, the

throughout this system, and mechanisms
absence of ready avenues of diversion,

for systematizing this discretion appear to
and the scarcity of resources is such that

be the exception as much as the rule.
most state courts can do little but react,

Thus, Gibbs (1978: 105) observes that ". . .
and slowly at that. These are "courts of

the system actually appears to be an
last resort." Many federal prosecutors

ungoverned mishmash," and Eisenstein
also are reactive. Their assumption is

and Jacob (1977:37) note that even "the
often that court resources are most effi-

judge does not rule or govern; at most, he
ciently organized to satisfy the demands

manages, and often he is managed by
of enforcement agencies. This assumption

others." Reiss (1971:120) goes on to sugis reflected in the explanation given us by

gest that "the major means of control
a U.S. Attorney for his reluctance to pur-

among the subsystems is internal to each"
sue one type of white-collar crime.

with the significant consequence that

It would be nice to investigate, let's say,

"each subsystem creates its own system
public corruption. "Okay, FBI, I want you

of justice." This situation becomes probto go out and develop snitches in all the

lematic when the attempt is made in such

HEW places where they might be taking

a system to establish or shift policies and

bribes" . . . but God knows how much time

[that would take] and we don't have the re-

priorities. Indeed, one of the fascinating

sources to do that. If I had some prosecutors
features of loosely coupled systems is

or some agents to whom I could say, "Okay,
their ability to circumvent such changes

I don't mind you wasting a year investigating
(see Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

this because we want it looked into," then I

Yet important changes in policies and

could see doing that. But if you don't have

priorities sometimes do occur, with sys-

the resources to do it, I just don't feel you

temwide repercussions. Within the crimiare using your resources right.

nal justice system, such changes are often

implemented through the prosecutorial

subsystem. Reiss (1974:690) indicates why

and how:

This reactive view is summarized in a

quote from .another U.S. Attorney inter-

view: "In my opinion, any time you deny

By legal authority and by practice, prose-

cutors have the greatest discretion in the

an agency the right to enforce its federal

laws, you are not doing the job you are put

formally organized criminal justice network.
here for."

... The way that prosecutors exercise disOther federal prosecutors find, in their

cretion over input and output varies consid-

roles, sources of flexibility that allow the

erably among jurisdictions. This variation is

development of proactive policies. First,

due partly to the organized forms of discre-

federal prosecutors have jurisdiction over
tion available to a prosecutor in a given

a broad range of white-collar offenses.
jurisdiction and partly to historical practice

Second, federal prosecutors can decline
within that office. The discretionary deci-

sions of prosecutors whether or not to file

information can exercise substantial control

cases or defer them to state courts, re-

serving resources for cases they assign

over input into the system, while the quanhigher priority. Third, the ratio of person-

tity and quality of output are determined
nel to cases is usually more favorable in

mainly by their decisions to nol pros or to
federal than in state courts. Fourth, fed-

plea bargain.

eral prosecutors often have investigatory

Drawing from Reiss (1971), Black (1973)

resources-particularly, federal agencies

and our own interviews, we suggest that

like the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

this prosecutorial power can be exercised

the Postal Service and the Internal Reve-

in two principal ways.

On the one hand, prosecutors can fol-

nue Service-that the state courts do not.

Consequently, U.S. Attorney offices in

low a reactive policy of law enforcement.

several large jurisdictions allocate their

Following this strategy, prosecutors can

resources to proactively initiate and en-

respond to police initiatives in the same

way in which the police do to citizen com-

courage the investigation and prosecution

of high priority cases. Thus, one U.S.
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Attorney interviewed noted that "In

terms of the decision-making process of

how and what cases will be handled and

The questions that follow are What is

the exact nature of this burden? and Why

is this burden so difficult to bear? Our

what will be done, a lot [of decisions] are

interviews suggest that the nature of the

being made here and not in the agency."

burden is negotiation: the development of

One way this is done is as follows.

cooperative witnesses through plea

negotiation. The process- and problems inThe U.S. Attorney's office can investigate

volved are suggested in another segment
cases in the grand jury, where it generates

information. In other words, we can initiate

of the above interview.

an investigation. What we do often is we

The negotiation proceeds within the confines

initiate investigations and then bring in the

of reality. That is the advantage I think good

agency that will have jurisdiction in that area

defense counsel has. . . . He knows and can

and be working with that agency in terms of

tell his client what is likely to happen, and

developing the grand jury investigation; but

how likely it is to happen. If we've got a

we are not limited to only acting on cases

weak case, we've got a weak hand. If you've

that come into the office after an agency has

got a really strong case, you hold four aces

done an investigation. We ourselves can ini-

on the top and he doesn't have any choice.

tiate the investigation, through the grand

Well, he does have a choice. Some people

jury.

just go down. They take their lumps and they

This proactive attitude is summarized in

the observation of another U.S. Attorney

don't want to talk.... One of the last chips

we have is that we can say not only are we

going to convict you and send you to prison
that: "We don't sit back and wait for

and you aren't going to get anything. After
cases to walk in the door. We go out and

that is all done, then we will put you in the

make them."

grand jury and we will get the information

However, use of grand juries is not suf-

anyway and you won't get any credit for it.

ficient to build important white-collar

Indeed at sentencing we will stand up and

cases in a proactive fashion. Information
make a point of the fact that you refused to

and evidence are needed to begin building
cooperate and that will be held against you

these cases. While in other prosecutions

and you will get even more time.

such information frequently comes from

The proactive prosecution of white-

victims and witnesses, the white-collar

collar persons and their white-collar

crimes of white-collar persons usually are

crimes, therefore, comes down to the

different: the complexity and diffuseness

problem of how to get the leverage re-

of the victimizations reduce the visibility

quired to "turn witnesses," and the key to

of these crimes and, therefore, the likeli-

obtaining this leverage is to forge a con-

hood of obtaining evidence from nonim-

nection between plea negotiations and

plicated persons.2 A U.S. Attorney ex-

concessions and coercion in sentencing.

plains the problem this way:

In other words, prosecutors must over-

... in these sort of activities, the only
come the tendency toward loose coupling

people with the information that you are
between most parts of the criminal justice

going to have to convict are the participants.

system, establishing instead a direct con-

It is not like a bank robbery where innocent

nection between plea negotiations and

people watch and see and identify. The only

sentencing decisions in white-collar cases.

way you can get these kinds of criminals is

This can be accomplished in at least two
through information supplied by partici-

ways: by carefully managing the severity
pants. You have to peel off the layers . ..

and that is difficult. That is a burden that is

tougher than the burden prosecutors in the

past had to deal with.

of the charges in these cases, so that

judges can use statutory guidelines in ar-

riving at lenient sentences, and by getting

judges to reward negotiated pleas directly.

That such sentencing decisions are gener2 Beyond this, even when such evidence might be

obtained through record searches, accounting pro-

ated is suggested by the following obser-

cedures, and the analysis of documents, the amounts
vation of an Assistant U.S. Attorney in

of material and the methods of investigation are so

charge of a subsection responsible for the

costly in man-hours and resources, both to develop

prosecution of official corruption in the
and to present in court, that such efforts rarely are

undertaken.

district best known in our sample for its
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early emphasis on white-collar crime: "I

would say most judges understand that in

order to expose official corruption you do

have to give some concessions to people

extensive these understandings are, one

implication of the connection we have

drawn between negotiation and sentenc-

ing will be an overall tendency toward the

who are involved. Again, because only

lenient sentencing of white-collar persons

those people who are involved know and

convicted of white-collar crimes. In the

can testify about it."3 Depending on how

remainder of this paper we use our quan-

titative data to examine evidence of this

and related possibilities outlined in the
3 The federal law itself can be an effective means

toward this end. For example, the Mail Fraud Stat-

perspective we have developed.

ute and the Travel Act have been used with consid-

erable "legal craftsmanship" to successfully prose-

THE PROSECUTION AND

cute important white-collar cases (see Henderson,

1977). An indication of the flexible way in which

SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR

these statutes have been used to generate cooperaCRIME IN TEN FEDERAL

tion and achieve convictions is suggested by the fol-

DISTRICT COURTS
lowing rather sardonic excerpt from a dissenting ap-

peal court opinion. This appeal resulted from the

The quantitative data we will consider
successful prosecution (during the period of our

consist of 9,068 cases prosecuted, and
study in what we later identify as a very proactive

district) of a major bribery case.

6,562 cases sentenced, in our ten district

I conclude by depicting a scenario which I have

courts over a period beginning in 1974 and

little doubt approximates the facts of this prosecu-

ending in 1977. These data were collected
tion. Federal officials, getting wind of a deal be-

by the administrative office of United
tween . . . state legislators and the . . . industry,

assign agents to investigate. In due course, immu-

States Courts, and our use of the data is

nity is promised to some of the involved legislators

premised on an agreement not to identify

and company officials in return for their coopera-

individual districts in our analysis.4 Be-

tion and testimony. Recording devices are placed

fore beginning this analysis, we must
on some of the immunized persons to obtain incul-

specify our operationalization of the conpating admissions from those who are the targets

of the prosecution. Once the investigation is com-

cept of white-collar crime.

pleted, consideration is then given to what federal

Although the term "white-collar crime"

offense, if any, has been committed. The Mail

has gained currency in several languages
Fraud Statute? The Federal Travel Act? The in-

and in popular thought, there is disagreevestigation files are searched to find some mailings

or evidence of interstate travel. The United States

Attorney's office sifts through the mailings in the

ment about its definition (see Geis and

Meier, 1977). As indicated earlier, much

file and then constructs a legal theory in order that

of the problem involves the kinds of

they may be used to form the basis for a charge of

crimes and kinds of people involved. Our
mail fraud. One fortuitous trip, totally incidental

analysis is based on an operational definiand unforeseen, by an unindicted coschemer

forms the basis of the two travel-act counts. A

tion that allows consideration of both the

conspiracy count is, of course, added. In this

offender and the offense. We began with a

fashion, the Mail Fraud Statute and the Travel Act

listing of all offenses in the United States

are subverted to purposes for which they were

never intended. No longer are the mailings and

travel considered essential or an integral part of

the scheme; they are seen and used to obtain fed-

eral jurisdiction.

offenses, pleaded guilty, and received one to two

years' probation and fines. This case usefully illus-

trates the important role which plea and charge
In the above case, the central "unindicted co-

negotiation can play in a proactive district in the
schemer" was separately charged with one count of

making a false statement on his Income Tax return

(that is, the bribe), to which he pleaded guilty. The

statutory maximum sentence for the latter offense

was three years imprisonment, and this offender re-

ceived one year on probation. The other legislators

prosecution and sentencing of important white-collar

cases.

4 These data were collected with special

provisions for quality control and comprehensive-

ness made possible through a mandate of the Speedy

Trial Act of 1974 to evaluate the experimental bail
in this case were charged with mail fraud, conspir-

acy, and travel-act violations, exposing them to

reform program established under this Act. All but

88 cases (which came into the data set in 1974) are
potential concurrent sentencing and a statutory

maximum sentence of five years imprisonment on

one count of mail fraud alone. All pleaded not guilty;

one was acquitted, while the others received three-

from the years 1975 through 1977. The provisions of

the evaluation were that a population of cases was to

be collected during this period. Our interviews in all

ten districts indicated full cooperation in the fulfillyear prison sentences and fines. A remaining group

ment of this mandate.
of corporate executives was charged with the same
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Code that could plausibly be thought of as

this research, the other offenses were

white-collar crimes.5 We then refined this

designated as common crimes. We pro-

classification by asking U.S. Attorneys in

ceeded by cross-classifying the dichotomy

the ten districts to approve or disapprove

with two dichotomized measures of the

of the inclusion of offenses, asking each to

offender's social standing: education (high

identify offense codes that were almost

school or less, and college or more) and

always white-collar, sometimes white-

income (less than $13,777, and $13,777 or

collar, and almost never white-collar.

Thirty-one offenses that elicited consider-

able consensus as white-collar crimes

were retained,6 and, for the purposes of

more, per year, in 1974-1977 dollars).

These are the most direct measures of so-

cial standing available in our data, and we

have dichotomized them on the basis of

Featherman and Hauser's (1978) recent

replication of the work of Blau and Dun-

s The original listing was made available to the

can (1967). Thus, our cut points corre-

authors by Stanton Wheeler and John Cardascia and

spond to the highest grouping of occupaconsists of 53 offenses abstracted from the Code.

6 A short description follows of 27 of these of-

tions considered in these studies.

fenses, with the Title number, Section number, and
Analyses reported in this paper have been

number of cases involving a college educated ofdone separately for the education and in-

fender indicated in parentheses: trust, etc., in re-

come measures, with, as we will see parstraint of trade (15:1:51); bankruptcy-concealment

of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery (18:152:1);

bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest-bribery of

tially in Table 1, substantially similar re-

sults. However, in deference to space

public officials and witnesses (18:201:5); bribery,
limitations, we present only the results in-

graft, and conflict of interest-salary of government

volving education beyond Table 1. Edu-

officials and employees payable only by U.S.

cation was selected over income for two
(18:209:1); bribery, graft, and conflict of interest-

offer to procure appointed public office (18:210:1);

claims and services in matters that affect

reasons: it allows us to consider women

without reported incomes in a more

government-conspiracy to defraud the government
meaningful manner, and it avoids the

in respect to claims (18:286:1); claims and services in

problem of correcting for a deflating dollar
matters that affect the government-false or fraudu-

over the several-year period. The resultlent claims (18:287:12); embezzlement and theft-

accounting for public money (18:643:1); embezzle-

ing cross-classification that forms a cen-

ment and theft-custodians generally misusing pubtral part of our analysis includes the fol-

lic funds (18:648:1); embezzlement and theft-theft,

lowing four kinds of cases: the common

embezzlement or misapplication by bank officers or

crimes of the less educated; the common
employees (18:656:57); embezzlement and theft-

lending, credit, and insurance institutions (18:657:6);

crimes of the college educated; the

embezzlement and theft-property mortgaged or
white-collar crimes of the less educated;

pledged to farm credit agencies (18:658:1); embezand the white-collar crimes of the college

zlement and theft-theft or embezzlement from em-

educated. As indicated earlier, the latter
ployee benefit plan (18:664:1); fraud and false

type of case is of greatest interest to us
statements-statements or entries generally

(18:1001:23); fraud and false statements-bank en-

because it is the "purest" form of white-

tries, reports, or false transactions (18:1005:2); fraud
collar crime we can identify and because

and false statements-federal crime institutions en-

we expect prosecution of this type of case

tries, reports, and transactions (18:1006:1); fraud and

to exhibit the most interesting variation
false statements-Department of Housing and Urban

Development and Federal Housing Administration

across districts.

transactions (18:1010:2); fraud and false
The first step in our analysis was to

statements-Department of Housing and Urban De-

examine the distribution of prosecutions

velopment transactions (18:1012:1); fraud and false

and dispositions for the four offenderstatements-loan and credit applications generally,

also renewals and discounts, crop insurance

(18:1014:14); mail fraud-frauds and swindles

offense combinations in all ten districts.

What we found was a striking similarity in

(18:1341:56); mail fraud-fictitious name or address
these distributions for nine of the ten dis-

(18:1342:2); mail fraud-fraud by wire, radio, or

tricts. The tenth, which we call District C,

telephone (18:1343:6); attempt to evade or defeat tax

(26:7201:11); failing to file tax return (26:7203:28);

fraud and false statements (26:7206:23); fiduciary re-

sponsibility of officers of labor organizations

(29:501:1); fraudulent acceptance of payments-

veteran's benefit (38:3502:6). Four additional of-

ignated as white-collar by U.S. Attorneys in our

interviews. However, these offenses did not result in

convictions for college educated offenders in our

data.
fenses (18:2073; 26:7207; 26:7262; 49:322) were des-
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Table 1. Prosecutions and Dispositions for Offender-Offense Combinations in District C and Other Dis-

tricts*

District C Other Districts

Prosecutions

Education Education

Crime High School College High School College

Common 83.9o 16.1% 83.3% 16.7%

Crime 86.3% 56.7% 79.6% 91.6% 80.5% 89.5%

66.7% 12.8% 74.6% 15.0o

(598) (115) (713) (6094) (1222) (7316)

White- 5 1.9o 48.1% 64.4% 34.6%

Collar 13.7% 43.3% 20.4% 8.4% 19.5% 10.4

Crime 10.6% 9.8% 6.5% 3.6%

(95) (88) (183) (560) (296) (856)

Convictions

Education Education

Crime High School College High School College

Common 83.7% 16.3% 83.9o 16.1%

Crime 84.1% 51.5% 76.2% 90.7% 78.2% 88.4%

63.8% 12.4% 74.2% 14.3%

(443) _ (86) (529) _ (4352) _ (838) (5190)

X sentence = 8.04 X sentence = 5.60 X sentence = 7.35 X sentence = 6.59

White 50.9% 49.1% 65.6% 34.4%

Collar 15.9% 48.5% 23.8% 9.3% 21.8% 11.6%

Crime 12.1% 11.7% 7.6% 4.0%

(84) _ (81) (165) _ (445) _ (233) (678)

X sentence = 4.13 X sentence = 3.49 X sentence = 4.43 X sentence = 4.64

Convictions

Income (1974-1977 $) Income (1974-1977 $)

Crime 13,776- 13,777+ 13,776- 13,777+

Common 89.8% 10.2% 92.9% 7.1%

Crime 85.4% 39.1% 76.2% 90.0% 72.3% 88.4%

68.4% 7.8% 82.1 6.3%

(475) _ (54) (529) _ (4,819) _ (371) (5,190)

X sentence = 7.60 X sentence = 8.11 X sentence = 7.31 X sentence = 6.18

White 49.1% 50.9% 79.1% 20.9%

Collar 14.6% 60.9o 23.8% 10.0% 27.6% 11.6%

Crime 11.7% 12.1% 9.1% 2.4%

(81) _ (84) (165) _ (536) (142) (678)

X sentence = 4.10 X sentence 3.55 X sentence = 4.38 X sentence = 4.98

* Each cell of each cross-classification is percentaged first by row, second by column, and third in relation

to the full cross-classification.

was distinguished by its disproportionate

prosecution of white-collar persons in-

volved in white-collar crimes. Table 1 pre-

sents the distribution of prosecutions and

dispositions, by offender and offense, in

District C as compared to the other nine

4.5%) and 4% (ranging from 2.4% to

5.4%). When income is used as the mea-

sure of social standing in Table 1, the dis-

parity in convictions between District C

and the other districts increases slightly to

12.1% as compared with 2.4%. At a mini-

mum, then, District C prosecutes and

districts.

Table 1 reveals that while 9.8% of the

convicts more than twice the propor-

prosecutions and 11.7% of the convictions

tionate number of white-collar persons for

in District C include college educated per-

white-collar crimes as do the other dis-

sons involved in white-collar crimes, the

respective figures for the remaining dis-

tricts are 3.6% (ranging from 2.7% to

tricts. Thus, although the caseloads of

none of the districts are overcrowded with

the latter types of cases, both in prose-
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cutions and convictions, District C is

clearly the deviant case. Yet another way

large numbers of bank clerks for small-

scale embezzlements and less educated

of making this point is to indicate that,

citizens for relatively small-scale income

while District C prosecutes only 9.9o of

tax violations (see Long, 1979). The other

the cases handled in all ten districts, it

side of this situation is that college edu-

prosecutes 22.9% of the white-collar cases

cated persons, also, of course, are prose-

involving college educated persons. The

cuted and convicted for common crimes.

respective conviction figures are 10.6%

In fact, there is rather striking consistency

and 25.8%, and 10.6% and 37.1% when

in the finding that approximately 16% of

income replaces education as the measure

of social standing. These data suggest that

the prosecutions as well as of convictions

for common crimes, in District C as well

whether education or income is used as

as in other districts, involve college edu-

the measure of social standing, District C

cated persons. Although the figures for

has followed a uniquely proactive pattern

income are smaller (10.2% and 7.1%),

in its prosecution of white-collar crime.7

there is consistency here as well. This

Returning to Table 1, we should also

consistency is in contrast to the variation

note that in none of the districts does the

we find in the prosecution and conviction

prosecution of white-collar crime pre-

of white-collar persons involved in

dominately involve what might con-

white-collar crimes.

ventionally be regarded as white-collar

persons. Approximately half of the

We have also included in Table 1 mean

sentence scores (see Table 2 for the scale

white-collar crimes prosecuted (48.1%)

used) for the various offender-offense

and convicted (49.1%) in District C in-

groupings. Several things are apparent in

volve college educated persons, compared

these figures.

First, although there is a general tend-

to about one-third in the other districts

(34.6%; 34.4%). A similar pattern prevails

ency across districts for white-collar

in the part of Table 1 that replaces educa-

crimes to result in lighter sentences than

tion with income. Thus, although District

common crimes, the disparities involved

C again demonstrates a more proactive

are greater in District C than in the other

emphasis on the white-collar crimes of

districts.

Second, in District C, whether educa-

white-collar persons, this emphasis is by

no means exclusive. This finding is con-

sistent with the observation of Katz

(1979:433) that "There are relatively few

tion or income is the measure of social

standing, white-collar persons prosecuted

for white-collar crimes receive the most

crimes that can be committed only by

lenient sentences. (By contrast, in the

those in white-collar occupations" and the

other districts, the lightest mean sen-

observation of Geis (1974:284) that "white

tences are received by less educated and

collar crimes can be committed by per-

lower income persons prosecuted for

sons in all social classes." Federal prose-

white-collar crimes.)

cutors not only believe, but also act on,

this assumption-pursuing, for example,

Third, with the exception of instances

when income is considered in District C,

the common crimes of common criminals

result in the most severe sentences.

7 District C is uniquely proactive in the sense that,
Fourth, the largest disparity in mean

by the measures applied, it is the most proactive

sentences reported in Table 1 is within

district in our data. This said, we should also note

District C, and it involves the common
that while the volume of white-collar cases prose-

crimes of the less educated (X = 8.04) and
cuted and convicted in District C is not dramatic, the

reallocation of resources required to pursue even this

the white-collar crimes of the college edu-

number of cases is probably substantial. Our point is
cated (X = 3.49).

simply that white-collar cases require a dispropor-

Fifth, when comparisons are made be-

tionate investment of resources and that, therefore,

tween the same offender-offense groupthe doubling of the proportionate number of prose-

cutions and convictions (albeit still not large) in Dis-

ings in District C and the remaining dis-

trict C is probably a more dramatic difference than it
tricts, the most consistent disparity ob-

might otherwise seem. This point is addressed again,
served across the districts is in the mean

in a somewhat different way, in the conclusion to this

sentences received by college educated

article.
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white-collar criminals (X = 3.49 and 4.64)

which the defendant was convicted,

and high income white-collar criminals (X

ethnicity, sex, age, and employment

= 3.55 and 4.98). A possible implication of

status; then, we added to these consid-

these findings, consistent with the per-

eration of whether or not the defendant

spective outlined earlier in this paper, is

was undergoing treatment for physical

that the proactive prosecution of white-

and/or mental illness. Our interviews sug-

collar crime in District C results in more

gested that the latter two variables might

lenient sentencing, particularly for white-

be particularly relevant for white-collar

collar persons. However, before in-

defendants. In addition, our sensitivity to

ferences are drawn from these findings, it

the impact of prior processing decisions

is necessary to consider a number of other

on sentencing suggested the inclusion of

relevant variables. We do this in the mul-

bail status (ordinally ranked on the basis

tivariate analyses presented in following

of our interviews and on an evaluation of

the fiscal and personal constraints in-

sections of this article.

volved), whether the defendant pleaded

Finally, although we might have ex-

pected more variation across districts in

guilty, and a consideration of charge re-

our data, we should note that the unique

ductions. Since multiple defendants are

position of District C is not surprising.

common in white-collar cases, we also in-

This is the District in our data set that is

cluded a measure of their presence in our

best known for its early emphasis on the

analysis. Several of the variables intro-

duced thus far have particular significance

prosecution of white-collar crime. This

tradition was established most visibly by a

for this study and are discussed further,

U.S. Attorney who made the proactive

here.

pursuit of white-collar crime and political

For example, statutory seriousness is

corruption a focal point of his work. The

an important variable to the perspective

impression formed in our interviews, in

developed in this paper. This variable is

the public statements of officials in the

measured in terms of the maximum prison

Department of Justice, and in recent

sentence provided in the United States

highly publicized cases being pursued in

Code for the charge initially placed against

the federal courts is that this is a style of

the offender (charge reductions are con-

administration that is going to become

sidered below). Since white-collar crimes

more prominent in the federal system.

generally are assumed to carry lower stat-

Thus, the following comparative analysis

utory maximums then common crimes,8

of sentencing patterns in District C and

and because prosecutors can also use their

the other nine districts may be important

discretion in selecting the statutory seri-

to not only the debate on status charac-

ousness of the charge, the statutory seri-

teristics and sentencing but to our under-

ousness variable may be expected to form

standing of the shape of things to come, as

a particularly important link in the prose-

well.

cution and sentencing of white-collar per-

sons for white-collar crimes.

From the perspective on white-collar

METHODS AND MEASUREMENT

crime outlined earlier, the offender's plea

Table 2 presents the variables and their

is also expected to be a very significant

codings to be considered in this analysis.

link between prosecution and sentencing.

Variables are included on the basis of the

At minimum, a guilty plea in such a case

perspective outlined above, prior research

(e.g., Hagan, 1974; Chiricos and Waldo,

1975; Burke and Turk, 1975; Bernstein et

saves the resources otherwise required to

establish guilt in court. Since important

white-collar cases are characteristically

al., 1977; Nagel, 1980; Swigert and Far-

complex, this is often a considerable sav-

rell, 1977), concerns for multicollinearity,

ings. Beyond this, many guilty pleas in-

and suggestions arising from our inter-

views. Thus, we began with a traditional

8 Consistent with this assumption, there is a cor-

list of variables that includes prior adult

relation of- .14 in our data between statutory seri-

felony convictions, statutory seriousness
ousness and those white-collar crimes involving col-

of the offense, number of charges for

lege educated persons.
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Table 2. Variables, Values, and Descriptive Statistics

Adjusted

Variables Values X s N %

Prior Convictions Actual Number of Adult Felony Convictions .99 2.05

Statutory Maximum Sentence Allowed by Statute

Seriousness 7.74 5.81

Number of Actual Number

Charges 2.11 1.91

Multiple No = -1

Defendants -.47 .88 4821 (73.5)

Yes= 1 1741 (26.5)

Ethnicity Nonwhite = -1 -.03 .99 3379 (51.5)

White = 1 3183 (48.5)

Sex Male = - 1 -.68 .73 5509 (84)

Female = 1 1053 (16)

Employment Unemployed= - 1 .01 1.00 3238 (49.3)

Employed = 1 3324 (50.7)

Physical Illness Not Under Treatment = -1 -.62 .79 5307 (80.9)

Under Treatment = 1 1255 (19.1)

Mental Illness Not Under Psychiatric Treatment = -1 -.94 .35 6359 (96.9)

Under Psychiatric Treatment = 1 203 (3.1)

Age 17= 1 2.33 .72 13 (.2)

18-37 = 2 4797 (73.1)

38-46 = 3 984 (15.0)

47-59 = 4 659 (10.0)

60+ = 5 16 (.2)

Bail Status 4.29 3.00

Personal Recognizance = 1 1337 (20.5)

Unsecured Bond = 2 844 (12.9)

Unsecured Bond plus supervision or other

conditions of bail = 3 1670 (25.6)

10% Cash deposit = 4 290 (4.4)

10% Cash deposit plus supervision or other

condition of bail = 5 410 (6.3)

Collateral = 6 17 (.3)

Collateral plus supervision or other conditions

of bail = 7 33 (.5)

Surety Bond = 8 1099 (16.8)

Surety Bond plus supervision or other condi-

tion of bail = 9 706 (10.8)

Remand = 10 128 (2.0)

Plea Pleaded Not Guilty = -1 .76 .66 802 (12.2)

Pleaded Guilty = 1 5760 (87.8)

Charge Reduction Petty Offense to Felony = -3 .50 1.21 15 (.2)

Misdemeanor to Felony = -2 309 (4.7)

Petty Offense to Misdemeanor = -1 0 0

No Change = 0 4522 (69.0)

Misdemeanor to Petty Offense = 1 189 (2.9)

Felony to Misdemeanor = 2 798 (12.2)

Felony to Petty Offense = 3 723 (11.0)

College Educated Dummy Variable with Less Educated Com-

White-Collar mon Criminals as Reference Category

Criminals .048 .213 314 (4.8)

Less Educated Dummy Variable with Less Educated Com-

White Collar mon Criminals as Reference Category

Criminals .081 .272 529 (8.1)

College Educated Dummy Variable with Less Educated Com-

Common Criminals mon Criminals as Reference Category .14 .348 924 (14.1)

Income 0-$13,776 1.099 .299 5911 (90.1)

$13,777+ 651 (9.9)
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Table 2. Continued

Adjusted

Variables Values X s N %

Sentence Severity Suspended Sentence or Probation w/o Super-

vision = 0 6.90 6.24 158 2.4

Fine and/or Restitution = 1 143 2.2

Probation or Probation plus fine and/or Res-

titution 1-12 months = 2 518 7.9

Probation or Probation plus fine and/or Res-

titution 13-36 months = 3 1678 25.6

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

1-6 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney-General 1-6 months plus fine

and/or Restitution or Probation or Proba-

tion plus fine and/or Restitution 37 months

or more = 4 876 13.3

Split Sentence or Split Sentence plus fine

and/or Restitution (6 months or less) = 5 751 11.4

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

7-12 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney General 7-12 months plus fine

and/or Restitution = 6 205 3.1

Mixed Sentence 6-12 months = 7 139 2.1

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

13-24 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney General 13-24 months plus fine

and/or Restitution = 8 437 6.7

Mixed Sentence 13-24 months = 9 61 .9

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

25-36 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney General 25-36 months plus fine

and/or Restitution = 10 394 6.0

Mixed Sentence 25-36 months = 11 37 .6

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

37-48 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney General 37-48 months plus fine

and/or Restitution = 12 194 3.0

Mixed Sentence 37 months or more = 13 51 .8

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

49-60 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney General 49-60 months plus fine

and/or Restitution = 14 249 3.8

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

61-84 months or Incarcerated in Custody of

Attorney General 61-84 months plus fine

and/or Restitution = 17 265 4.0

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General

85-120 months with or without fine and/or

Restitution = 21

Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General 219 3.3

120 months or more or Incarcerated in

Custody of Attorney General 120 months or

more plus fine and/or Restitution = 30 187 2.8

volve the cooperation of the offender in

prosecutorial and judicial subsystems may

building a case against others. Thus, in

be an important source of the differential

these types of white-collar cases, we ex-

sentencing of white-collar offenders. In

pect the plea entered to have a notable

this data set, guilty pleas are coded 1,

effect on the sentence imposed-

pleas of innocence- 1.

particularly in a district where the prose-

Charge reductions may also influence

cution of a large number of these cases is

sentence severity, as a way of rewarding

made a priority. This coupling between

cooperation in white-collar cases. Charge
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reductions are coded from- 3 to 3 in terms

of all six possible movements up and

down in severity among petty offense,

misdemeanor, and felony. No change is

revisions in this scale derive from our

interviews and are intended to reflect

further gradations in the severity of sen-

tences imposed.

coded 0. However, it should be noted that

the possibilities for charge reductions in

the federal courts are not as great as in the

state courts:

Our analysis of the variables described

above is based on conventional regression

procedures. The strategy followed is to

focus first on District C, in comparison to

all other districts. Our purpose is to exThe reason for this difference is that state

amine comparatively the consequences of
criminal codes include lesser offenses to

which charges frequently can be reduced,

whereas the federal criminal code typically

the proactive prosecution of white-collar

crime in District C. The perspective de-

does not. . . . A result is more explicit reveloped earlier suggests that the proactive

course to discussions of sentencing and reprosecution of white-collar persons for

lated sanctions. (Hagan and Bernstein.
their white-collar crimes requires conces-

1979:470)

sions in sentencing, and it is this possibil-

The implication is that in the federal sys-

tem the plea itself may be a more potent

variable than the charge reduction.

The next three variables in Table 2 in-

volve the offender and offense compo-

ity that we first consider. We then go on to

examine more specifically the factors

leading to severe or lenient sentencing for

each of the four offender-offense combi-

nations in District C, as compared to the

nents of white-collar crime. The three

other nine districts. This second phase of

variables considered derive from a

the analysis explores which of the other

dummy coding (see Kerlinger and

Pedhazur, 1973) of our earlier cross-

classification of the offender's education

and offense. Each of these variables,

when included in the regression analyses

that follow, yield a coefficient that repre-

sents the difference in sentence for cases

classified as the specified offender-offense

grouping compared to those that are

classified as a designated "reference cate-

gory." For the purposes of our analyses,

we have designated the common crimes of

less educated persons as our reference

category. This will allow us to estimate an

effect parameter for each of our

offender-offense groupings, compared to

independent variables may contribute to

the expected differential sentencing of

white-collar offenders in District C, as

compared to the other districts. The per-

spective developed earlier suggests that

concessions in the sentencing of these

cases may follow from lenient initial

charges, the rewarding of guilty pleas,

and, possibly, charge reductions. These

are the factors judged important in tight-

ening the connection between the prose-

cutorial and judicial subsystems, thereby

circumventing the obstacles posed to pro-

active prosecution in a loosely coupled

system. Furthermore, if this tightening of

connections between the prosecutorial

the reference category, with all other vari-

and judicial subsystems does occur, we

ables in the regression equation taken into

should also expect an increase in our

account. As an example, we will be able to

examine whether the disparity-observed

earlier in the sentences received by col-

lege educated white-collar criminals, as

compared to less educated common

criminals-persists when the other inde-

pendent variables just discussed are taken

into account.

ability to explain sentencing decisions in

these types of cases-a consequence of a

recognized common goal in a system

otherwise characterized by divergent sub-

system concerns. We also examine these

expectations in the second phase of our

analysis.

We should note that all comparisons

The last variable in Table 2, sentence

severity, is our dependent variable. The

coding of this variable derives from the

undertaken in the remainder of this article

effectively involve populations or sub-

populations. That is, we are not dealing

efforts of Tiffany et al. (1975) to devise an

with samples, but, rather, with the full

approximate interval scale of the severity

volume of cases involved in any given

of different sentencing options. Minimal

comparison (see footnote 4). Nonetheless,
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we report tests of significance in the tables

tricts. Our primary interest in these re-

that follow. These tests can be interpreted

gressions is to see if-other variables held

as checks on other kinds of random errors

constant-the sentencing of white-collar

(for example, random measurement

persons for their white-collar crimes var-

error). Our approach is to consider effects

ies among these districts. The results pre-

statistically significant at the .05 level and

sented in Table III indicate that this group

better, with betas larger than .10. Al-

is indeed sentenced differently in District

though there has been some debate as to

C than in the remaining districts. A com-

whether standardized or unstandardized

parison of unstandardized regression

regression coefficients are more appropri-

coefficients reveals that while in the re-

ate for the types of comparisons made in

maining districts college educated white-

this paper, the more recent judgment is

collar criminals do not receive signifi-

that both have their place (Hargens, 1976).

cantly more lenient sentences than the

Therefore, both coefficients are reported

reference category (less educated com-

in our tables. However, there are some

mon criminals), in District C the former

instances where unstandardized coeffi-

group does receive sentences that in com-

cients will be more suitable for our pur-

parison to the latter group are nearly three

points lower (r = -.21; b = -2.72; B =

poses. For example, the standardization

-.16) on the sentence severity scale.

of dummy variable coefficients can be

misleading, particularly when the distri-

However, what we did not anticipate is

butions of these variables are skewed

that less educated white-collar criminals

(Cohen and Cohen, 1975:184). Therefore,

experience a nearly identical leniency (r =

where dummy variables are involved, un-

-.18; b = -2.70; B = -.16) in District C

standardized coefficients will be empha-

that, again, is not paralleled in the re-

sized in the analysis that follows.

maining districts. College and less edu-

cated common criminals are not dramat-

ically differentiated in the sentences they

THE ANALYSIS

receive in either District C or the remain-

The results of the first part of our

analysis are presented in Table 3. This

table reports the results of regressing

sentence severity on our independent

variables separately in District C, the pro-

active district, and in the remaining dis-

ing districts. Overall, then, Table 3

provides provisional support for the per-

spective we have proposed: with a variety

of other important variables held con-

stant, our proactive distirct does grant le-

nient sentences to college educated

Table 3. Regression of Sentence Severity on Independent Variables in District C and Remaining Districts

District C Remaining districts

(N=694) (N=5868)

Independent Variables r b B S. r b B S

Prior Convictions .23 .45 .14 .000 .23 .36 .12 .000

Statutory Seriousness .19 .04 .05 NS .29 .25 .22 .000

Number of Charges -.02 .11 .04 NS .07 .23 .07 .000

Multiple Defendants - .03 .25 .04 NS .10 .47 .06 .000

Ethnicity -.04 .30 .05 NS -.08 -.42 -.07 .000

Sex -.10 -.50 -.05 .100 -.17 -.82 -.10 .000

Employment -.25 -.60 -.12 .001 -.15 -.50 -.08 .000

Physical Illness .08 .34 .05 NS -.02 -.07 -.01 .000

Mental Illness .04 .55 .04 NS -.01 -.15 -.01 NS

Age -.02 .25 .04 NS -.03 -.07 -.01 NS

Bail Status .37 .68 .28 .000 .50 .80 .37 .000

Plea -.20 -1.02 -.13 .000 -.14 -.68 -.07 .000

Charge Reduction .21 .58 .12 .001 .10 .15 .03 .009

College Educated White-Collar Criminals - .21 -2.72 - .16 .000 - .07 .34 .01 NS

Less Educated White-Collar Criminals - .18 -2.70 -.16 .000 - .11 .46 .02 .10

College Educated Common Criminals -.08 -.15 -.09 .009 -.02 -.12 -.01 .000

R2 =.298 R2=.326

Intercept=4.65 Intercept= -.80
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Table 4. Regression of Sentence Severity on Independent Variables for Offender-Offense Combinations in

District C

Less Educated College Educated

Less Educated White-Collar College Educated White-Collar

Common Criminals Criminals Common Criminals Criminals

(N=443) (N=84) (N=86) (N=81)

Independent Variables b B s b B s b B s b B s

Prior Convictions .55 .15 .001 .21 .20 .086 .15 .07 NS -.07 -.02 NS

Statutory Seriousness .01 .01 NS .07 .09 NS .36 .39 .004 .48 .42 .003

Number of Charges -.01 -.01 NS .06 .10 NS .25 .17 NS -.05 -.06 NS

Multiple Defendants .43 .07 NS -.24 -.14 NS .14 .03 NS -.41 -.18 NS

Ethnicity .50 .08 .07 -.29 -.18 NS -.37 -.09 NS .14 .04 NS

Sex -.68 -.06 NS -.03 -.02 NS -.46 -.07 NS -.42 -.08 NS

Employment - .78 - .13 .003 - .48 - .24 .043 .33 .07 NS - .06 - .02 NS

Physical Illness .71 .09 .05 -.01 -.01 NS -.48 -.08 NS .16 .05 NS

Mental Illness .22 .01 NS .93 .27 .024 1.46 .14 NS .36 .07 NS

Age .19 .02 NS .28 .17 NS .15 .03 NS -.01 -.01 NS

Bail Status .96 .34 .000 .05 .09 NS .53 .24 .07 .15 .13 NS

Plea -.84 -.10 .016 -.26 -.07 NS -.88 -.13 NS -1.26 -.24 .028

Charge Reduction .72 .13 .002 .11 .08 NS -.42 -.09 NS .48 .16 NS

R2=.27 R2 =.25 R2=.28 R2=.39

Intercept= 3.88 Intercept= 3.85 Intercept=2.30 Intercept=3.27

white-collar criminals, while the remain-

offender-offense groupings, first in Dis-

ing districts do not. However, this same

trict C, then in the remaining districts. We

pattern is apparent for less educated

note first in these tables that, consistent

white-collar criminals. Thus, the issue

with the perspective outlined earlier, the

that remains is whether these two

highest explained variance involves the

offender-offense groupings actually differ

sentencing of college educated white-

in ways consistent with the perspective

collar offenders in District C (R2 = .39).

we have proposed. This issue is pursued

We take this as one indication of a tight-

in the next phase of our analysis.

ening of connections in an otherwise

loosely coupled system. Beyond this,

Tables 4 and 5 present the results of

however, we are anxious to determine

regressing sentence severity on our inde-

where such a tightening in subsystem oppendent variables within each of the four

Table 5. Regression of Sentence Severity on Independent Variables for Offender-Offense Combinations in

Remaining Districts

Less Educated College Educated

Less Educated White-Collar College Educated White-Collar

Common Criminals Criminals Common Criminals Criminals

(N=4352) (N=445) (N=838) (N=233)

Independent Variables b B s b B s b B s b B s

Prior Convictions .34 .11 .000 .29 .11 .013 .59 .18 .000 .39 .21 .001

Statutory Seriousness .24 .22 .000 .04 -.03 NS .29 .23 .000 .04 .02 NS

Number of Charges .30 .08 .000 .14 .15 .001 .17 .05 .058 .15 .14 .017

Multiple Defendants .51 .07 .000 .24 .06 NS .42 .06 .027 .26 .07 NS

Ethnicity -.47 -.07 .000 .05 .02 NS -.44 -.07 .010 .03 .01 NS

Sex -.90 -.10 .000 -.32 -.12 .011 -.63 -.07 .017 -.48 -.13 :047

Employment -.54 -.08 .000 -.06 -.02 NS -.51 -.09 .003 -.18 -.05 NS

Physical Illness -.11 -.02 NS .05 .02 NS .15 .02 NS .11 .03 NS

Mental Illness -.38 -.02 NS 2.01 .23 .000 -.01 -.01 NS .11 .01 NS

Age -.19 -.02 NS .12 .05 NS -.05 -.01 NS .56 .17 .007

Bail Status .83 .38 .000 .30 .25 .000 .75 .39 .000 .40 .32 .000

Plea -.81 -.08 .000 .27 .06 NS -.43 -.05 NS .12 .02 NS

Charge Reduction .14 .03 .041 -.07 -.02 NS .10 .02 NS -.27 .07 NS

R2=.32 R2=.21 R2=.35 R2=.29

Intercept= .537 Intercept=4.80 Intercept= .564 Intercept= 1 .33
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erations may occur. Thus, our next inter-

maximum sentence of five years. Beyond

est is in comparing the effects of our inde-

this, both distributions tend to be bimodal:

pendent variables on sentence severity,

each has a concentration of charges in the

particularly in cases of college and less

one- and five-year categories. The dif-

educated white-collar offenders. Com-

ference is that District C has a bigger con-

parison of the latter offender-offense

centration of cases toward the nonserious

groupings will help to determine whether

end of the continuum, while the remaining

the lenient sentencing observed above for

districts have their heaviest concentration

both of these groupings in District C fol-

of cases more toward the serious end. The

lows from similar or different types of

bimodal character of these distributions is

considerations.

consistent with our suggestion that, to

Within District C, and in relation to the

successfully build the evidence necessary

remaining districts, such comparisons re-

to get convictions in major white-collar

veal very different patterns of effects. For

cases, it is necessary to offer concessions

example, we find in Table 4 that, con-

in other potentially serious cases. What is

sistent with our perspective, in District C

most interesting from our perspective,

statutory seriousness (the seriousness of

however, is that this pattern is particularly

the initial charge) has the biggest effect on

pronounced in District C, where white-

the severity of the sentences received by

collar crime has been pursued in a very

college educated white-collar defendants

proactive fashion.

(B= .42, p= .003). In contrast, the effects

Also consistent with our perspective is

of this variable for the comparable cases

the effect of the next most influential vari-

in Table 5, and for the cases of less edu-

able, the plea, in the sentencing of college

cated white-collar criminals in Table 4,

educated white-collar criminals in District

are negligible (B = .02 and .09).

C. Those who plead guilty in District C (b

To extend our understanding of this

=-1.27, p= .028) are more likely to get

rather striking difference, we generated

lenient sentences, while no similar signifi-

the frequency distributions of statutory

cant effect (b= .12) exists in the remaining

seriousness in both District C and the re-

districts, or for less educated white-collar

maining districts. These distributions are

criminals in District C (b = -.26). From

presented in Table 6. What we find is

our perspective, the implication is that

that, although this variable has approx-

prosecutors in the proactive district are

imately the same standard deviation in

successful in getting judges to reward and

District C (s = 5.90) and in the other dis-

punish the cooperativeness of college

tricts (s = 5.79), the difference between

educated white-collar offenders. As ex-

these distributions is nonetheless dra-

pected, then, the two most important

matic. In District C, the modal initial

variables explaining the tendency in Dis-

charge carries a maximum sentence of one

trict C to sanction more leniently college

year in prison; in the remaining districts,

educated white-collar criminals are their

the modal initial charge carries a

pleas and the initial charges placed against

them. We will also discuss a quite dif-

ferent pattern that is apparent in cases of

Table 6. Frequency Distributions of Statutory Seriless educated white-collar offenders.

ousness in District C and the Remaining
One other variable, charge reduction, is

Districts

noteworthy for its absence of effect on the

Remaining
sentencing of white-collar cases in all dis-

tricts. As indicated earlier in our discus-

Maximum District C Districts

No. of Years No. % No. %

sion, this may be a result of the limited

1 49 60.5 31 13.3

opportunities for charge reduction in the

2 2 2.5 15 6.4
federal system. The effect of this situation

3 5 6.2 25 10.7

may be to relegate much prosecutorial

5 24 29.2 156 67.0

negotiation to less visible stages that pre10 1 1.2 2 1.0

cede initial charging decisions. We have

15 0 0.0 4 1.7

X =6.74 X =7.87

already noted that, in District C, the stat-

s=5.90 s=5.79
utory seriousness of the initial charge has
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its most pronounced effect for college

educated white-collar criminals. In con-

trast, in the more reactive remaining dis-

tricts statutory seriousness has a promi-

nent effect in the cases of less educated

common criminals. The volume of these

cases and the influence of this variable

may reflect the tendency of these more

reactive districts to balance the needs and

wishes of the enforcement agencies that

focus on more traditional crimes.

We turn now to a consideration of a

very different pattern of effects apparent

in the sentencing of less educated white-

collar criminals in both District C and the

remaining districts. At this point it may be

useful to recall that these cases consist in

greater leniency for those offenders who

remain employed probably reflects a

willingness to let these offenders work out

arrangements to make restitution in lieu of

more severe punishments. The concern,

at least in District C, would seem to be as

much with remedying the behavior as with

punishing it. In any case, we clearly have

demonstrated that the differential leniency

experienced by college and less educated

white-collar offenders involves some very

different considerations. We take this as

support for our argument that the lenient

sentencing of white-collar persons for

their white-collar crimes derives from a

set of circumstances that distinguish the

proactive prosecution of this type of case.

A final finding, consistent across all

large part of income tax violations and

bank clerk embezzlements. Since we did

not anticipate the lenient treatment that

these offenders receive in District C, our

interpretation of these effects is, clearly,

ad hoc. Nonetheless, we will begin by of-

fering one suggestion as to why college

and less educated white-collar criminals

receive a similar type of leniency in Dis-

trict C. This suggestion is no more com-

plicated than the observation that similar

types of charges are placed against these

offenders and that, once concessions are

granted to the higher status white-collar

districts, merits our attention. This finding

is that bail status has a substantial impact

on sentencing that is particularly consis-

tent for common criminals (the B's range

from .24 to .39). The implication of this

finding is that negative bail decisions have

particularly disadvantaging consequences

for all kinds of common criminals. This

finding is not new, but it is nonetheless

interesting to find that it holds in the fed-

eral courts, bound by the Federal Bail

Reform Act, as well as in the state courts

(see Bernstein et al., 1977).

offenders, it may be difficult not to grant

them more generally, at least where simi-

CONCLUSIONS

lar statutory provisions are involved. In

Gilbert Geis (1974) has made two im-

more familiar terms, a privilege once

granted is difficult to deny later. Beyond

portant points about the study of white-

this, it seems plausible to interpret the

collar crime. The first point is that rela-

pattern of effects for this group in District

tively few original pieces of research have

C in terms of a compliance, as much as a

punishment, model. Thus, the two most

prominent findings for this group in Dis-

trict C are that being employed results in

more lenient sentences (B = -.24), while

being under psychiatric treatment results

in more severe sentences (B = .27). The

former finding applies only in District C,

while the latter finding applies in the re-

maining districts as well. This second

counter-intuitive finding apparently re-

sults from a provision in the federal code

which allows offenders thought mentally

ill to be institutionalized for a 90-day

"psychiatric study," and, then, to be re-

sentenced at the end of this period. Alter-

natively, the finding in District C of

been published on white-collar crime

during the past two decades (see also

Wheeler, 1976). The second point is that

further study of white-collar crime is im-

portant because it can tell us a great deal

about the way power is exercised in our

society. To these important points, we

would add another: examination of the

prosecution and sentencing of white-collar

crime can tell us much about how the so-

cial organization of a particular type of

crime can influence the way it is con-

trolled. In turn, this type of understanding

may do much to enlighten a long tradition

of research on status characteristics and

sentencing.

We noted in the beginning of our dis-
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cussion that the above type of sentencing

crimes of more-highly educated persons

research has suffered from inadequate

are actually handled in the unique way our

data. The inadequacy of these data is less

perspective suggests. However, our sub-

the failing of social researchers than it is a

sequent analysis of cases falling within the

failure of the system to prosecute and

separate offender-offense groupings con-

sentence any large volume of important

white-collar cases. The infrequency of

these prosecutions derives not only from

firmed that quite different factors were in-

volved in the sentencing of each, and that

college educated white-collar persons in-

the power of the persons involved but also

deed were sentenced on the basis of sev-

from the manner in which these criminal

eral of the considerations emphasized by

activities are organized. Most common

crime involves victims or witnesses and is

our perspective. In an ad hoc fashion, we

speculated that one reason less educated

pursued reactively in response to their

white-collar criminals may also receive

complaints. In contrast, most white-collar

lenient sentences in District C is because

crime involving white-collar persons is

characterized by a diffuseness of

they are charged under similar statutes:

once these statutes are used in a lenient

victimization and an absence of unimpli-

fashion, it may be difficult to deny their

cated witnesses. As a result, a proactive

wider application. This interpretation is

organization of legal resources usually is

consistent with our earlier findings that at

required to seek out and build these

a bivariate level it is college educated

white-collar cases. Since, frequently, only

white-collar criminals who actually re-

the participants in these criminal events

ceive the most-lenient sentences in Dis-

can provide the information necessary to

trict C, and that it is a higher concentra-

build successful cases, prosecutorial

tion of this latter type of case in District C

negotiation becomes a key part of the pro-

that makes it most unique. Nonetheless,

active prosecution of these cases. Fur-

we take these findings collectively as indi-

thermore, to make this negotiation work,

cating the importance of further research

a connection must be forged between the

on the ways in which types of persons,

prosecutorial and judicial subsystems,

crimes, and control strategies interact.

such that the promises and concessions

offered white-collar offenders are actually

More generally, our findings have

theoretical-as well as policy-

confirmed at sentencing. We have argued

implications. They suggest, on the one

that this type of connection is the excep-

hand, why previous research has rarely

tion more than the rule in a criminal jus-

found relationships between status char-

tice process we have called a loosely

acteristics and sentencing to be large: as

coupled system.

critics have suggested, there simply may

The overall implication of the organ-

izational relationships we have described

is, of course, that white-collar persons will

receive lenient sentences for their white-

not have been enough variation in the

types of offenders and offenses studied to

generate such relationships. This does not

make the prior research wrong; it simply

collar crimes. However, it is important to

makes it representative of the types of

note that this disparity might be expected

courts studied. On the other hand, the

only where the prosecution of white-collar

modest relationship reported in this study,

cases is proactive enough to generate a

for District C (r= .21; b= -2.72; B= -.16),

large volume of cases. This is, of course,

may be all the more striking given that-

exactly what we found in our data: college

even in this proactive district-college

educated white-collar criminals received

educated white-collar criminals make up

more-lenient sentences only in District C,

only 11.7% of the population sentenced

our most proactive district.

(cf. Cohen and Cohen, 1975:178). The

What we did not anticipate on the basis

interesting possibility this point raises is

of the perspective developed in this paper

that the observed relationship may grow

is that less educated white-collar criminals

as the volume of cases (or, in other words,

would also receive lenient sentences in

the level of proactive prosecution) in-

District C. A question that follows from

creases. Put differently, there may be an

this finding is whether the white-collar

inverse relationship between the volume
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of white-collar convictions and the sever-

ity of white-collar sentences. At this

parities. Notwithstanding important re-

forms in the federal bail system, we have

found that bail decisions still exert a perpoint, concerns about deterrence and

equal treatment may come into conflict:

sistent impact on the severity of the sen-

tences received by common criminals.
convictions may be enough to deter some

white-collar crime, but they are not

enough to establish a sense of parity in the

treatment of white-collar and common

Even more significantly, however, we

suggest that the independence and varia-

bility of prosecutors demonstrated in this

study is a neglected consideration which
crime.

These concerns are aggravated by the

should reduce widespread expectations

that recodification of the criminal law,
further findings that the lenient sentencing

of college educated white-collar criminals

in our proactive district apparently is as-

sociated with the less-serious charges

placed against these offenders and with a

rewarding of their guilty pleas. The sense

is of a style of prosecution that gives pref-

sentencing guidelines, and reform or

elimination of parole will eliminate sen-

tencing disparities. Such reforms can

readily be counteracted by shifts in prose-

cutorial policies on charging and plea bar-

gaining and this seems particularly likely

in an area as socially and legally sensitive
erential treatment to highly educated

as white-collar crime. The differential
white-collar offenders. That this may be

what is required to successfully prosecute

important white-collar cases is an un-

sentencing of white-collar offenders is a

social as well as a legal problem.

comfortable paradox that policy makers

as well as theorists will do well to conREFERENCES
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